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of sex, seniority, kinship, caste, place-fellowship, and even friendship, the junior category, all are at work.

Religions perish, fear of *mana* is more and more circumscribed, the specific classifications primitive man has made for nature are rejected, even the classifications he has made for himself, for society, are questioned, but the impulse to classify persists; it is the impetus left over, so to speak, from his first impulse for social classification, his earliest attempts to satisfy his gregarious instinct. Out of that instinct develop, we may say, not only scientific methods, but scientific curiosity and the will for scientific research. Science is a fruit of gregariousness.

In conclusion let me ask behaviorists if gregariousness among animals shows any relation to curiosity or to fear of the strange or novel? Are the more gregarious creatures the more curious? Are they more fearful of the unexpected or less? Or, put better, perhaps, are animals less fearful and more curious when they are together?

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Man of Genius. HERMANN TÜRCK. London: Adam and Charles Black. 1914. Pp. 463.

Among the new insights into the German mind with which we have been favored this past year, not the least interesting has been the discovery of a certain contemptuous tolerance of morals as a set of rules and principles having jurisdiction only in the secondary affairs of life. It would seem that many Germans of education mean by morality merely the approved, but not rationally obligatory, customs of society. This appears to be Dr. Türck's view; for he says, for example, "Goethe is undoubtedly right when he says that 'the man who acts is always devoid of conscience.'" Yet, curiously enough, much the greater part of the author's book is distinctly ethical; and it is in that field that its chief, if not its sole, excellences are found.

There are, indeed, metaphysical sections; but they are quite uncritical, and rather hamper than further the argument of the book. It seems to be assumed that no enlightened reader will be Philistine enough to challenge the world-transcending Hindu and Neo-Platonic monism, while Spinoza is quoted with something like the naïve reverence of a medieval Thomist citing the Stagirite. Let the following extract—which might well be a modern epitome of one of the Enneads, and which is supported by no argument whatever—serve as a sample:

"God has divided Himself into an infinite number of creatures. He has descended from His infinite greatness, freedom, and perfection, and now lives in a humble form in the atom, in the worm, in man. Yet the

divine element does not renounce its nature even in its humble shape, but strives to return from the multiplicity of finite limited existences to the unity of the highest being, of the most perfect life" (p. 218).

Notwithstanding the expectations naturally aroused by the title, the author gives us no distinctly psychological analysis of the man of genius, but occupies himself almost exclusively with the ethical *conditions* of genius, ethical, that is, in the Anglo-Saxon sense. Taking as his text (frequently reiterated) the statement of Schopenhauer that "*genius* is simply the completest *objectivity*, *i. e.*, the objective tendency of the mind, as opposed to the subjective, which [latter] is directed to one's own self," Dr. Türck bids us find the secret of genius in the power (and habit) of its possessor of occupying himself with objects and affairs regardless of their bearing upon his selfish interests, and with full surrender to the implications and suggestions of the thing under consideration. The common man is blinded to the subtle, far-reaching, and perhaps inspiring relations of objects because he is obsessed with a persistent concern as to their bearings upon his own little self. He can not, for example, see the real forest, with its biological, esthetic, and metaphysical significance, because of his greedy interest in board-feet and market profits. Selfishness—which, following Schopenhauer, is identified with subjectivity—the author thinks of after the loose fashion of common life. There is no recognition of the fact that the so-called selfish man is really seeking simply certain satisfactions of desire, and is not—or at least is rarely—concerned with his self, is, indeed, full often acting against its best interests. Dr. Türck's thesis is that the man who is completely objective in his interests, who cares for things for themselves regardless of their bearing upon his "selfish" concerns, is able to find in the objects of sense stepping-stones, or, better, successive points of flight for sweeping upon wings of suggestion and insight through the wide domains of the universe. All things are his; in greater or less degree all existence is accessible to him. He is the man of unfettered insight, that is, the man of genius.

His genius may appear in one or more of three forms, according to the part of the conscious life in which this noble objectivity finds scope. (1) If that takes place in the field of perception, he becomes an artistic genius. "To be able to paint with genius," we are told, "one must be able to see with genius. . . . When a bull and a Raphael contemplate the same landscape, the landscape of course remains the same; what is not the same, however, is the impression received by each. . . . A Raphael . . . sees even the most delicate shades of color . . . and all these colors, lights, and lines awaken peculiar, harmonious feelings in his mind" (p. 4). In the forest, for example, "the artist loves the object that he contemplates . . . he is engrossed by the sight of it. . . . He is, indeed, all eye and ear, delighted by the fragment of still-life before him that speaks in so eloquent a language to his heart; he seeks to give expression to his feelings, and thus there arises . . . a poem, a song, a picture, or a marble statue" (pp. 16 ff.). That it is the artist, and not the common man, who thus sees and feels and expresses himself is due to the fact that "among the numerous sense stimulations that reach us simultaneously at any given instant we always make

a selection," and "this selection . . . is directly influenced by man's conscious or unconscious will, by his impulses, inclinations, interests, by his whole character" (p. 10)—that is, by ethical factors in the individual. It is added that "this disinterested absorption in the contemplation of the object is identical with love for the object" (p. 18), and that the man thus objectively interested in (or loving) the objects of the world "recognizes himself in them, and God within him perceives Himself in His world. . . . The artistic genius observes with the eyes and hears with the ears of God" (pp. 14 ff.).

(2) *Philosophical* genius has its seat in the second stage of mental process, that of reflection. It is "objectivity, disinterestedness, love in thinking" (p. 29), thinking in this case being, not the ordinary man's adjustments of plans for realizing "selfish" ends, but the tracing out of the universal and eternal relations of things,—the invisible framework of the universe. Everything, we are assured, is "based on a plan or an idea," and to investigate a thing philosophically "is to comprehend its total idea, . . . to reproduce in one's own mind that plan on which the life and action of the object is founded" (p. 36). "Now, the essential mark of genius is this absorption in the real nature of objects" (p. 37); that is, it is, in Spinozian speech, "the intellectual love of God."

(3) Practical genius, likewise, is rooted in objectivity, but now in the motor field. "The mode of action of the man of genius will consist in doing what he does with all his soul, with a complete devotion to the work itself, be it what it may" (p. 53). Every ulterior end being either absent or subordinate, the activity of genius partakes "of the nature of *play*." "The secret of the all-conquering power of genius lies precisely in the fact it inwardly assumes a free [*i. e.*, "unselfish"] attitude towards its own conduct, and consequently, unhampered by personal consideration, acts with extraordinary energy and boldness. . . . The activity of genius is in the highest sense of the word play, it is free activity, aimless for the man himself like any other game" (p. 83).

Metaphysics apart, these points seem to be well taken. They fall in quite harmoniously, as the author points out, with the teaching of Jesus as to the need of losing one's life in order, in the highest sense, to find it. But what we have offered us is evidently a description rather than a definition of the man of genius. We can not convert the account, and say that every man who attains to any one—or, indeed, to all—of these kinds of objectivity is a genius. He is no doubt a superior man and an admirable one. He is, perhaps, the wise man of the Greek ethical schools; but he is by no means necessarily a genius. No man of ordinary mental endowment could by a lifetime of persistent self-schooling in "objectivity" raise himself to the genius level; for genius connotes a distinctly unusual amount or intensity of power, and not merely the right application of it. The author ignores this rather obvious truth, notwithstanding the fact that the study of "Faust," with which his fifth chapter is taken up, brings him repeatedly to Goethe's references to the "magic" of genius. He sees, indeed, that in the poem "magic is the symbolic expression for the power of genius which gives man a clearer insight and can, so to say, bring about marvels"; yet

the word seems to have no psychological suggestions for him. I think his readers would like greatly to know in what that "*magic*" consists; whether, for example, it lies simply in a heightening and wider organization of the subliminal process of ordinary perception and reflection.

Moreover, even ethically it may be doubted if Schopenhauer's "completest objectivity" is a *sufficient* account of the man of genius; for is not action which is truly self-regarding also characteristic of genius? In the case of the man of action the answer seems so obviously to be in the affirmative that our author is constrained to devote a chapter to the support of his claim that Alexander, Cæsar, and Napoleon were not properly self-seeking men (!), but were men who lived "in the Idea"—Goethe's phrase—the Idea "of the highest, the most perfect state of existence" (pp. 273 ff.). They threw themselves whole-heartedly into certain great plans, fully conscious that these, owing to the manifold contingency of the world, might well prove impossible to realize, but sought them none the less, because they felt impelled to the struggle; they enjoyed the game. The prizes that would go to the winner were so uncertain as to be secondary considerations with them.

Let it be granted that there is force in this consideration, it seems still to be true that, in his own way, the genius is often a self-seeker, a man of keen spiritual appetite and a vehement disposition to self-appropriation. What he looks upon as likely to make for his own self-development—matter of knowledge, for example, and still more suggestions for action—are pounced upon and made his own with little enough hesitation or scruple. Indeed, the distinction between self-seeking and devotion to the objective of which Dr. Türk makes so much is of very doubtful validity. The true distinction appears to be that between small and narrow interests—bodily satisfactions, for example,—and great ones.

Naturally a writer who exalts the centrifugal forces in human nature at the expense of the centripetal, and who honors Christ and Buddha because they are awakeners of "mental freedom" (in his objective sense) is not favorably disposed to the unbounded egoism of Nietzsche and Max Stirner. He is scandalized by Nietzsche's remark that it is "a sign of strong character, *when once the resolution has been taken* [italics mine], to shut the ear even to the best counter arguments,"—which, after all, is substantially the second maxim of the rationalist Descartes—and sees in it only a justification of stupid devotion to selfish interests.

Naturally, too, Lombroso's theory that genius is an abnormal development, an overgrowth of one part of the nature at the expense of other parts, is rejected by Dr. Türk. He criticizes the Italian's logic with much effect, not denying the "law of compensation" *in toto*, but maintaining that Lombroso greatly overworked it in the interest of his theory.

Interesting chapters are devoted to studies of Hamlet, Faust, and Byron's Manfred, in all of which creations the author finds illustrations of his doctrine of objectivity as the secret of genius. The book is excellently made as regards paper, print, and binding.

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